On Jesse Prinz, “Morality is a Culturally Conditioned Response,” and Martha Nussbaum, “Judging Other Cultures: The Case of Genital Mutilation.

What do you think of Jesse Prinz’s argument that morality is a culturally conditioned response grounded in emotion rather than reason? Do you agree that there is no objective basis for morality, and to what extent is his argument convincing or unconvincing?

I would say it appears plausible in some sense, or more precisely, I would agree that emotion-based morality is a part of the big picture. In terms of the specific empirical evidence Prinz listed in the article, a typical response could be that correlation does not entail causation—or more specifically, some extent of psychological dependence does not entail metaethical reduction. It is contestable to argue that those correlations indicate a necessary basis for morality or, specifically, for emotion-based morality. From my own perspective, I would even put a question mark on the mutually exclusive diagnosis here between emotion and reason regarding their potential to be the objective-or-not basis for morality—if there is any.

Instead, I would try to propose another alternative mechanism1, given this tug of war between emotion and reason. To simplify the case and make a concession in favor of the emotion-based argument, let's temporarily accept the physicalist or reductionist approach to the hard problem so that we could envision, case by case, that a particular emotion would identically correspond to a particular squiggle or brain state in our physical body. I suppose this assumption would make the thought experiment for this emotion-based morality argument easier to navigate. Given the identity theory, we may say it is compatible with this emotion-based morality theory in terms of there indeed being distinct emotional states for an individual to be the basis of something from the very beginning; it is also thus possible in such a case that people may share the exact same emotions given the same physical condition.

However, given this assumption that is in favor of the emotion-based argument, one may still argue that although the starting point of making moral decisions could be the exact same emotions, the resultant decisions may still be drastically different. This is due to the different reasoning models, habits, and patterns distributed among individuals and across cultures—even if the exact same emotional states serve as the same starting point for making a moral decision, the outcomes are, in fact, determined by the divergent reasoning frameworks. Thinking of an extremely complex function—or maybe an LLM architecture—which could accept the exact same input but produce completely different outcomes based on the particular internal structure of the function or the model2, not to mention that our "functions" of reasoning certainly develop over time in reality so that the same individual may hold different moral stances and produce different moral decisions over time.

In a sense, Prinz may argue that we are still using reason to extend the feelings or emotions we already have. However, I believe in this particular case, it is "reasonable" to argue that the particular functions or models we use are more fundamental or more basic than the emotions as the starting points. What produced the eventual moral decision made is the function, the model, or the reasoning process itself, instead of the emotional starting point as a simple input "value," as reason reclassifies, dethrones, reinterprets, and disciplines emotions.

Of course, this entire alternative approach I propose here is actually based upon a premise that Prinz may not even agree with. In order for the conclusion of reaching cultural relativism from the fact that emotion is the basis of morality, the hidden premise Prinz would have is that emotions are by nature subjective, contingent, or culturally relative instead of objective. Therefore, this alternative approach is only presented to suggest that emotions, even in an objective sense, may not be the basis for morality, while whether emotions are subjective or objective is, by itself, still a question tied closely to the hard problem of consciousness, despite the fact that they are certainly a crucial part of moral cognition.

On the other hand, I do lean towards a relativist stance—and, certainly, a part of the reason I only lean towards a relativist stance instead of claiming that I am 100% one is that the stance by itself entails that I cannot even be sure that my own position is morally correct. If we do adopt the framework of choosing between emotion and reason to be the basis of morality, then, even if from the previous argument I may seem to lean towards reasoning in this case, it is still "undoubtedly true," ironically speaking, that although many people believe that the reasoning structure or principles themselves could be universal across cultures—which, evidently, is also not exactly the case, the very premises or beliefs we use within the reasoning process are by themselves never guaranteed to be universal or true as we differ in understanding of concepts, social narratives, background beliefs, upbringings, etc.—in other words, this is similar to the typical cases where the argument or reasoning may be valid but not sound.

That said, it seems to me that even if there is any basis for morality or, even more, a universal basis for morality, at least both emotion and reason do not seem to be valid candidates to me. While I also do not have another strong candidate—other than some kind of interaction system in which reasoning architecture processes emotional input, which does not seem to be a candidate for any universal normative ontological basis at all beyond a plausible causal basis of an individual—I will indeed keep leaning towards a relativist stance at the moment.

What do you think of Martha Nussbaum’s argument that we can be sensitive to cultural differences while still criticizing practices like female genital mutilation? Does she successfully respond to cultural relativism, or does her argument rely on assumptions that a relativist would reject? & Nussbaum rejects several relativist defenses of FGM, including charges of ethnocentrism, while Prinz warns against assuming moral superiority across cultures. To what extent does Nussbaum successfully avoid the charge of ethnocentrism? Where, if anywhere, does her argument rely on culturally specific values that Prinz would challenge?

Before we proceed, I believe it's necessary to lay out the disclaimer first: I personally am against FGM and agree that it should be on the list of human rights violations—but there is always this "but." In fact, I once wrote about whether we should "respect" everything last winter. Borrowing terms from back then, I would say in this particular FGM case that I personally can only "admit" and "understand" to some extent. By "understanding" here, it means that I could reasonably, hypothetically, but not empathetically follow the reasoning of the cultural justifications within those traditions that practice FGM—while it still does not entail that I agree with those reasonings and justifications, but only understand them. And understanding, in this case, hopefully, may make my criticism more informed instead of bottled.

In Nussbaum's argument, one of the key moves towards the end is the attempt to resort to existing internal dissent as an anti-ethnocentric strategy, which ties back to the general objectivist/universalist stance. From my perspective, it is evident that this is a deliberate move, with decent effort put into it, which tries to avoid the charge of ethnocentrism. And it is indeed important to recognize that the internal dissent shows the outsider are not inventing objections or totally imposing their view. However, the very fact that there is dissent—or, in a more general case, different voices within a cultural group—could be interpreted differently—maybe it actually shows how relative it could be when it comes to moral standards, even within "one cultural group."3

Therefore, by this internal dissent argument itself, I don't believe it could justifiably avoid all charges against potential ethnocentrism except for showing Nussbaum's effort given. However, my defense on behalf of Nussbaum, even as a quasi-relativist, is that even within the relativist framework, a certain level of weak ethnocentrism may be inescapable.

Since a relativist stance is not equal to saying, "I do not have a belief or value," but only saying that all of our moral worldviews are historically and culturally situated and conditioned and none of us are necessarily completely correct, I would say that in this process of comparing and evaluating our own moral worldviews against others, it seems inevitable for one to start with their own stances and beliefs to coordinate and position the others. Subsequently, when there is a clash and conflict, a reasonable relativist would still prefer, presumably, their own stances without assuming they are correct.4 Such cases are what I dub "weak ethnocentrism" per se, where moral judgment cannot happen from nowhere but somewhere, and our self-awareness, while it may be favorable, does not eliminate it.

For example, beyond the most straightforward stance of "I am against FGM," there are quite a lot of things within Nussbaum's argument that I would personally agree with, including:

We don't have to wait until we're perfect before speaking up.

FGM is not like dieting or body shaping on a more fundamental level, as it includes: (a) Force (b) Irreversibility (c) Severity of harm (d) Consent (e) And other forms of inequality

In essence, to my reading and agreement, Nussbaum is arguing that people should be able to retain certain basic capabilities, opportunities, and powers from a human rights perspective that concerns dignity, equality, and bodily integrity, etc., regardless of whether they choose to exercise those capabilities, opportunities, and powers or not. However, from my perspective, I would say these are only my views again. And when Nussbaum emphasizes them in the article, there is also no definitive evidence that these consensuses, although may be admirable for many, are or should be universal truths or transcendent stances, rather than mere standards and understandings shared and agreed among us—among a great deal of people with some general liberal cosmopolitan humanistic gene in particular, as an informally titled global cultural group of ours. In this case, as the widespread infiltration, or endorsement in a nicer term, does not itself guarantee universality nor objectiveness, I'd say it is indeed relying on some culturally specific values that Prinz would challenge.

However, again, this does not necessarily mean that I fully agree with Prinz. In fact, I do believe even as a relativist, we will be able to be sensitive to cultural differences while still criticizing practices, acknowledging the inevitable weak ethnocentrism we all have.

From my point of view, what really matters beyond whether to criticize is how to exercise the criticism. Some important elements for an ideal participant5 surely include having a certain level of self-awareness—at least pursuing a certain level of self-awareness—and conducting self-criticism equally when criticizing others as Nussbaum is aware of in the article, being able to treat conflicts with tolerance, caution, and humility—ideally without being affected too much by the irregular emotive states that Prinz refers to, being open to potentially change our own understanding, and being extra cautious when escalating criticism to any level of intervention and ready to undertake the risks and potential consequences of doing so, if ever.6

Eventually, I would say that Nussbaum's project is compatible with a relativist view on a practical level, which, of course, is very much demonstrating one of the features of a relativist view: that it is designed to accommodate different moral worldviews. Therefore, Nussbaum's argument is more sound in terms of criticizing FGM within a very broad or general cultural group and suggesting, thus, how to criticize responsibly with cultural sensitivity, rather than metaethically escaping completely from relativism. To be unnecessarily extra critical, a more radical relativist could even argue that Nussbaum's stance is due to the failure of realizing the relative nature of morality and masking its own culturally conditioned morality under the ostensible universality. Nonetheless, I suppose Nussbaum would resist the compatible perspective as her project is indeed aiming to be an anti-relativist on a capacity theory basis.

P.S. Admittedly, this kind of modest relativist stance I hold now may be only pragmatically and functionally feasible interpersonally—at least I cannot justify it as confidently as I sound now when it comes to collective decision making, in other words, in politics and for the humanities in general. Ironically, this seems to diverge from taking "culture" as the unit of argument. And it certainly concerns the action problem—which is also evident in my personal life.7 At the end of the day, there are scenarios in which the "cautious approach" can paralyze and demands immediate action, even if it's, strictly speaking, a form of imposition—can I suppose the most we can do is to at least acknowledge that imposition and the implications of such. We'll see.

1 Which seems to me particularly plausible, but, eventually, may end up unclear on the "basis" part of the project. ↩

2 In LLM terms, it would be different internal weights, inference parameters, etc., and in human terms, it would be different levels of reasoning inclination, analogies, habits of attention, standards for consistency, etc. ↩

3 As Nussbaum herself pointed out, “culture” should not be treated as one unified voice. ↩

4 A similar rationale can be extended to humencentricism as well in terms of how we use ourselves as a reference, even aiming at some post-humanism objectives. ↩

5 See? I'm exclaiming my moral worldview again. And certainly not everyone would be this or agree with this "ideal" participant image. ↩

6 For example, even if external support was requested from a culture or group within, it is still requested by another sub-part of the culture, or subculture. ↩

7 Although I'd say it's getting "better" ever since I wrote this. ↩