# Which Objectivity Are We Talking About? Published: 2026-04-19 Canonical: https://journal.xiaotianfanx.com/journal/which-objectivity-are-we-talking-about On Thomas Nagel, “Ethics” from The Last Word, and Sharon Street, “Does Anything Really Matter or Did We Just Evolve to Think So?" One of the key tensions I found in Nagel's piece, or at least as it seemed to me to be unresolved, is the dichotomy between the capability of stepping back to reason upon what we should do and the implied objectivity of this move. Or, in other words, the tension between this move and the "irrational“/conditioned drive. In fact, borrowing a similar reasoning from Nagel himself, the fact that we are able to step back at certain points (although it seems to us to be an admirable move) does not necessarily entail that the move itself is objectively rational. Just like Nagel says, that how we develop our moral preferences as a result of conditioning does not automatically prove that there is, in principle, no objectivity, we could also say that how we face certain decisions using the stepping-back strategy does not prove that this strategy or move is by itself an objectively rational one. It is totally possible that this move itself, and the reason behind our making this move, is also due to our upbringing and conditioning. In terms of the "inescapable demand" for justification, I think there is still a gap between our attempting to justify a moral preference (or our attempting to rely on rational reasoning) and the fact that our justifying or reasoning process itself is rational or, to some extent, objective. Speaking from a Humean perspective, I think the real risk lies exactly in this "stepping back" process of justification. It seems to take for granted that having another order of justification or reasoning would, by default, constitute some level of rationalization towards an objective ground. However, the very justifications we could have developed and the very reasoning efforts we could have devoted may, by themselves, still be subjected to our conditioning and irrational desire—only hidden under the hood of multiple layers or orders of justificatory attempts. Again, as we are speaking, we seem to adopt a view that justification and reasoning are admirable in this case. There is indeed another gap still between generalizing our reasoning to "everyone" in this situation. The fact that we can, by theory, think of what anyone in my situation should do does not equal the fact that our reasoning should objectively be applicable to everyone in my situation. Being able to reason and think from our perspective on this question does not entail that there is a certain objective answer to this question. In other words, it is more than evident that Nagel's claim would eventually face the bootstrapping and infinite regress problem. The former happens when every time Nagel tries to ground objectivity by pointing to a feature of reasoning, one could always ask: Is that feature itself objective, or is it just another layer of conditioning? The latter suggests that in the different orders of desires or judgment, when we are infinitely stepping back, we eventually face the Agrippan trilemma, where we need to accept that reasoning either: Terminates in a bedrock assumption step (Desire, from a Humean perspective; Reasoning itself, from Nagel's perspective; Self-evidence of some truth, from a classical rationalistic perspective?) Becomes circular Regresses infinitely without a firm ground Of course, there is a pragmatic move that Nagel could adopt: we were to say that indeed, we can never prove outside our reasoning the objectivity of reasoning itself. But that should be applicable to both the objectivist and the subjectivist skeptic. The question would then become: which view will make the most sense from within the practice of reasoning itself? By doing so, Nagel seems to shift the burden of proof or argument back to the subjectivist to show that his perceived stepping back move—as a normative question seeking an objective answer—is less acceptable/interpretively coherent. Anyhow, this concession will convert the previous metaphysical claim of proving moral objectivity into a pragmatic defense. In fact, when we speak of objectivity, there are essentially two kinds of things we may be referring to: Objectivity 1 This is some kind of mind-independent truth where moral facts stand "out there" independent of what anyone thinks. We may or may not approach this through our reasoning or other means. In other words, this is the objectivity within metaphysical realism about morality. Objectivity 2 This is what Nagel seems to be mostly defending: a rational inescapability, referring to how moral conclusions follow from reasoning in a way that all "rational agents" would have to be effectively bound. The objections here indeed also mostly apply to objectivity 2. Even if reasoning feels inescapable or needs to be treated as such, that doesn't prove it is objectively binding for everyone ubiquitously. There may be only very common and shared conditional features among us.1 At the end of the day, I do think neither Nagel's standpoint nor the typical Humean resort to ultimate non-rational desires can be proven from a neutral standpoint. Now moving on to Street's project, there are essentially two competing perspectives here. One, the mind-independent value from a realist standpoint. Two, the mind-dependent value from a more pragmatic standpoint. For the first perspective, at its core, it says that moral truths exist independently, like mathematical truths, and that evolution might have made us reliable detectors of these truths. However, the problem is that there seems to be no obvious connection, specifically—why would detecting independent moral truths promote reproductive success? Unlike detecting predators, which directly affects survival. As a result, at least according to Street, if value is mind-independent, then evolution gave us our values in a way that is unconnected to truth, but only to reproductive success (regardless of whether the values are independently "correct")—which would lead to a global evaluative skepticism with which we should abandon confidence in all of our values. On the other hand, if value is mind-dependent—constructed by our attitudes, which evolution did shape—then that's all there is to value, or, in other words, it is valuable because we value it. In this sense, although having been able to prevent falling into the skeptical hazard seems to justify our keeping our values, we must simultaneously accept the fact that there are no values out there independent of us. I'd say there is an interesting parallel between Nagel's case and the realist case here, as they both seem to face a gap between the process (whether reasoning or evolution) and the justification or proof for objective truth, whether it's moral objectivity or independent value. For Nagel, stopping at reasoning practices—or the effort to resort to the inescapable rationalization—seems to make it more privileged than the Humean stop at desires. However, it is not strictly proven. For the evolution case, it would have just pushed us towards whatever may promote reproduction and the succession of our species, and there is no obvious connection between that—between increasing the probability of reproduction—and "truth." Therefore, Street eventually dissolves the need for such a connection by promoting a mind-dependent view. Compare Street's distinction between mind-independent versus mind-dependent to the distinction between objective and relative. How do the two distinctions map onto each other? Looking closer into the potential mapping structure here, I'd say there actually exist two versions of the mapping. While the first simplistic one seems straightforward, it is incomprehensive to contain the implications of mind-dependent value. The first version goes like this: The mind-independent value maps closely onto objectivism, where the value (as given in this case by the evolutionary process) is independent of our mind, in such a way that it is objective. In contrast, as mind-dependent value cares about our attitudes (although shaped by evolution), then it is to say to be closer to relativism. However, the nuance seems to lie again in the particular versions of objectivity we are talking about. We shall replace the previous two-version framework with a new one to include another possibility. Objectivity 1 Largely the same; truly metaphysically independent of whatever we think. Where mind-independent value clearly satisfies, and mind-dependent value clearly does not satisfy. Objectivity 2 Mind-dependent or not, there is the same value/moral truth for all—not a mere matter of individual preference or cultural conditioning. Objectivity 3 Inherited mostly from the previous objectivity v2, saying that it is constrained by reasons and our rationality. For objectivity 2 and objectivity 3, a more sophisticated version of mapping (mind-dependent value) could potentially also satisfy the requirements. For example, it seems that a Kantian view—saying moral principles are those all rational agents would agree to—is both mind-dependent and universal/objective in terms of objectivity 2 here. And evidently, Nagel's inescapable rationality seems to fall under the definition of Objectivity 3 here (proven or not). Furthermore, apart from the objective potential of mind-dependent value, it also diverges into two potentials within a relativist understanding. It could be a culturally conditioned dependent value or a purely individually subjective value that depends on individual preferences. For Street in particular, I do think the mind-dependent conclusion is implied to live somewhere in between objectivity 2 and objectivity 3 here. There is no radical relativist argument presented, as it is acknowledged in terms of the remarkable uniformity of human values across cultures—within a narrow range compared to all conceivable values (echoing objectivity 2). It is also acknowledged or preserved that first-order moral reasoning can indeed live beyond simply expressing preferences (echoing objectivity 3). Therefore, the only obvious objection Street presents is against objectivity 1, and thus the stance there is evidently closer to Nagel's than it may initially appear to be, leading to our next question: Suppose Street is correct that we should take our most basic evaluative (including moral) convictions to be mind-dependent and accept the evolutionary biological explanation of our values. Would this affect how we should reason about morality? Could we still reason about morality in the way Nagel suggests, where we set back against the background of all one's desires and beliefs and ask for justification of a generalizable and universalizable form—"what should anyone in my situation do?"? A key element to making mind-independence and Nagelian reasoning work will be the extent to which internal rational structure is compatible with our attitudes, which Street seems to emphasize. The answer seems to be that our attitude does include an internal rational structure to reason upon. Otherwise, there is no space to discuss reasoning about values at all. All the questions concerning whether one attitude is consistent with another, whether this attitude is universalizable without introducing contradiction or further conflicts, and the like, involve reasoning upon our attitudes. So, at least in principle, the reasoning process itself is still tenable, although it is not guaranteed that the reasoning would work in the exact same way as Nagel suggests. For example, although "stepping back" may still have some normative "value", as it could reveal some hidden implications living within our attitudes and may resolve some tensions and incoherence in our attitudes with reasoning, it may still eventually be living on top of one attitude or another. That said, at best, the initial question of "What should anyone in my situation do? [Objectively?]" would have to live with an amendment or conditioning that goes something like "... given that we share this evolved evaluative nature and are trying to find universalizable and coherent values" to stay compatible. So that it eventually falls from objectivity 1, at a minimum—if Nagel's project hasn't already failed on it. Can you find a variant of Mind-Dependence that meets two requirements: (i) it presents a plausible condition on being a good thing (more plausible than Mind-Dependence); and (ii) evolutionary forces plausibly have made us good at grasping the condition (more plausibly than with Informed Mind-Dependence)? Starting with the informed mind-dependence, which says that people would value X if fully informed about X and its consequences, the problem is that it still fails to explain why we, at the end of the day, would become reliable to value X under idealization after evolution that places us in almost-always-unideal cases—it seems to implicitly rewind back to mind independence. One potentially promising alternative here would be what we might call a reflective equilibrium mind-dependence, with the core idea that goes something like this: X is good if and only if valuing X coheres with the most stable reflective equilibrium of our evaluative attitudes—meaning, the maximally coherent, consistent, and stable set of evaluative attitudes we reach by: Starting from our initial evaluative tendencies given by evolution Subjecting them to rational scrutiny in terms of consistency, universalizability, and the like Adjusting until we reach a stable, coherent system Where the system is stable against reflective destabilization The appeal here is, hopefully, evident: It allows for error (our current attitudes can be wrong if they don't cohere with reflective equilibrium), it explains something like moral progress (we're getting better at achieving that equilibrium), and it explains moral disagreement (we're at different points in the process, or perhaps starting from slightly different initial tendencies shaped by different cultural or environmental contexts). Most importantly, it seems to evade the gap problem that haunted informed mind-dependence—since the starting point, the initial tendencies, is exactly what evolution gave us, and the reflective process itself uses capacities evolution also provided (pattern recognition, consistency-checking, social coordination, future-oriented thinking). In other words, reflective equilibrium is constructed from our evolved attitudes, not independent of them, so there's less of a mysterious tracking problem about whether evolution made us reliable detectors of some external standard.2 However, there are, I'd say, a couple of fundamental questions left regarding this seemingly appealing proposal The first one concerns whether the universality of reflective capability is really universal in the way that matters; or, more precisely, whether from a relativist perspective—or from a top-down perspective looking at this entire debate—we really care if this structure is universal at all. It seems that the eventual output of our moralities is only considered relativist because of the perceived final diversity. Otherwise, using the reasoning I proposed earlier, I could also say it is universal to have some kind of reasoning structure (which is effectively what we are discussing as reflective equilibrium). In the process of reflective equilibrium, I could argue that the reasoning process itself—no matter how different individual instances may be—is a universal structure. However, that doesn't seem to really matter for the conclusion here. To put it more precisely, there is a vital distinction between what we might call procedural universality—everyone has reflective capacities, seeks coherence, engages in moral reasoning—and substantive universality—everyone reaches the same or at least convergent moral conclusions. If reflective equilibrium only delivers procedural universality, if different people or cultures can reach radically different but equally coherent equilibria, then what have we really accomplished? Saying "we all have reasoning structures" doesn't address moral disagreement if those structures produce incompatible outputs that are all equally "in equilibrium." I doubt that Street or Nagel would accept this as a form of objectivity if that objectivity does not lead to some kind of substantive alignment. What Nagel wants, it seems, is "reasoning correctly yields substantive moral truths," while what Street wants is to preserve our confident first-order moral judgments while explaining their evolutionary origins. What reflective equilibrium threatens to give us is "everyone reasons toward coherence, but culture A's equilibrium says X is fine, culture B's equilibrium says it's wrong, and both are equally 'in equilibrium.'" This would be, at best, sophisticated relativism. At the end of the day, although it might give us a process all humans share, a rational structure to moral thoughts, and some tools for internal critique, it surely doesn't give us convergence on substantive moral truths or grounds to say one equilibrium is wrong in comparison to another that an objectivist seems to actually pursue.   Another question remains—a potentially more troubling one—concerning the very notion of "reflective equilibrium" itself. Although it is said that reflective equilibrium is constructed from and in the process of evolved attitudes, not independent of them, the very fact that we are evolving towards something, that there is language of "progress" and "achieving" equilibrium, seems to rely on some pre-assumed final state of this evolution. It reminds me of the sort of "ultimate state" present in other views—Kantian views, for instance, where there's an ideal endpoint that reason converges on. That makes it suspicious to compare so-called "progress"—especially if we perceive moral diversity only as different stages of progress towards that equilibrium—as it eventually assumes that a particular equilibrium would be and should be reached given this mechanism.3 In that case, a bad practice of such a view would be saying that we'll be treating "our progress" or state in the process of reaching reflective equilibrium as more advanced than some others. There's also another element here that we touched on earlier, which is the distinction between what we might call mind-dependent or independent value versus mind-dependent or independent rationality. If rational principles—like consistency, universalizability, non-contradiction—exist independently of any minds, as abstract features of logic itself, then the evolutionary challenge Street raises for moral values would also apply to rationality—why would evolution make us reliable about abstract logical truths when it only cares about reproductive success? But if rational principles are constituted by the structure of reasoning minds rather than discovered from some external realm, if they're features of our rational practices rather than independent truths, then appealing to "rational requirements" to ground moral objectivity doesn't work—because those requirements are just features of our evolved reasoning capacities, not necessarily objective standards.4 It's not clear why rationality should get a special pass here. At the end of the day, I think what these discussions reveal—across Nagel, Street, and the reflective equilibrium proposal—is that if we're really serious about mind-dependence all the way down, including rationality itself, then we can't have the kind of objectivity they want (even if it's somewhere between objectivity 2 and 3). We do get something like a weak normativity internal to our practices, capable of criticizing incoherence; procedural universality in that we all reason and seek coherence; but we don't get a strong normative binding on all rational agents as such, or substantive universality where reasoning converges on moral truths, or objective grounds. At best, we could comment on another culture/moral worldview that "their values are incoherent by our standards of coherence, which are themselves not externally validated"—given we are kind enough to avoid simply saying "they are wrong, according to our standards." That said, it leads to this possibility, however uncomfortable for some, that any attempt to combine a naturalistic explanation of our moral capacities—whether through evolution, cultural conditioning, or both—with preservation of genuine moral objectivity in the strong sense, is going to face this same gap. Because genuine objectivity, at least in the way Nagel and Street seem to want it, requires some kind of transcendence anyway—a standpoint external to our situated, evolved, culturally-embedded perspective. But if we're naturalists, committed to understanding ourselves as thoroughly natural creatures shaped by natural processes, there is no such standpoint. We're left with either biting the relativist piece (accepting thorough mind-dependence and cultural construction, giving up on strong objectivity, focusing on responsible engagement across difference—what I called "weak ethnocentrism" on Nussbaum's case earlier) or accepting some minimal overlap objectivity in a positive sense instead of a normative one (perhaps a tiny thin core of values all cultures share due our common evolutionary heritage, beyond which there's legitimate diversity, which is effectively aligning with the relativist option 1) or settling for something pragmatic (values are "objective" if they enable sustainable, flourishing cooperation—though this sounds like sophisticated subjectivism, and also fascist societies can be stable). I suppose none of these fully satisfies anyone attempting to achieve a form of objectivism, but perhaps the honest conclusion is that we're indeed asking for something that may not be achievable without smuggling in assumptions we haven't earned. 1 However, by all means, we're not even trying to raise objections to phenomenological perception of ourselves seeking the normative ground, at least as a capability of us using "quote-unquote" our rational reasoning. And the first point Nagel raised against relativism—on how the causal origins of a belief do not by themselves show the belief is false—is also a valid point. ↩ 2 Similar to my previous alternative approach in the response to Prinze, where I suggested that identical emotional inputs could produce different outputs depending on reasoning frameworks—which maps beautifully here: evolution gives emotional inputs (initial tendencies), and cultural or individual reasoning frameworks are different processes for achieving reflective equilibrium, explaining moral diversity while preserving a universal structure of seeking coherent equilibrium. ↩ 3 And if there are multiple possible equilibria—which there likely are, some emphasizing autonomy, others community; some weighing liberty highly, others equality—then "progress toward equilibrium" becomes meaningless: toward which one? Resultantly, it will surely invite ethnocentric readings ("we're in equilibrium, they're not") and can't really distinguish progress from contingent historical change—is the abolition of slavery genuine moral progress toward the "true" equilibrium, or is it just contingent economic and social drift that we retrospectively label as moral progress because it aligns with our current values? ↩ 4 This connects back to the bootstrapping problem where Nagel uses reasoning to validate reasoning, which is circular—though perhaps unavoidably so, since any attempt to validate reasoning must use reasoning. In other words, the strategy depends on rationality having the kind of independent normative force that doesn't itself get undermined by evolutionary genealogy. ↩