# General and/or Fundamental
Published: 2026-01-22
Canonical: https://journal.xiaotianfanx.com/journal/general-and-or-fundamental

On What is Philosophy, by Monroe C. Beardsley and Elizabeth Lane Beardsley



	This is the first post of a new series of reading responses. Coincidentally or not, the two philosophy classes I'm taking this semester share the same requirements for the structure of the responses: one interpretive paragraph and one critical paragraph. 



	While I've always been using class input as writing prompts, I'd like to use this framework to potentially practice containing myself further from throwing too much too-personal content and the inclination to ramble tediously under one single post with frequent off-topic references and injections, but thinking slow and writing fast. 



	That said, I may still stretch beyond the designated two-paragraph structure after finishing it, and a post in this series may consist of the two structured paragraphs, some continuation in my usual writing style, a section of short quotes and my quick catches, some of my comments on my peers' discussion posts, and potential postscripts.







	In the course of attempting to define what counts as a philosophical question, Beardsleys offers two perspectives of consideration: general and fundamental. The former is to say that in the process of philosophizing, questions can become progressively general—in terms of the scope of the questions' concern—rather than focusing on a specific object, case, or class. The latter, argued to be more important, is highly related to beliefs. In essence, Bearsleys recognize one's beliefs to be interconnected, logically or not, and those connections reveal more and more fundamental ones in our if-shared belief systems. For a question to be highly fundamental, it questions "the truth of a highly fundamental belief," and the answers to it may cause serious impact/consequences. Therefore, a philosophical question is general enough and/or fundamental enough to cover a universal scope and/or probe deep to attempt to reach the bottom line of our beliefs.



	It is reasonable enough to juxtapose "general" and "fundamental" when suggesting perspectives. On the other hand, as Beardsleys points out, the latter is essentially more important—or fundamental—to the question of what is a philosophical question to an extent that the general is a by-product of thinking and reasoning into the fundamental. In other words, the fundamental is a necessary condition of a question to be "philosophical" within this framework, and the sufficiency will depend on how fundamental it is. While Beardsleys terms that "the more general a question is, the more fundamental it is likely to be," I would suggest the positive correlation will still hold vice versa, likely, even if the question itself may not be phrased to seem general. Going back to the seminal example "Does God exist?", Beardsleys considers it in no way general due to the fact that it concerns a single being. As they state, right after, that this question is fundamental to many people, and its answer has both a remarkably direct impact on those people and an indirect impact on other beliefs that rely on it, it seems to me the question is in no way less general, general in terms of its far-reaching impact. In fact, following this thread, it seems to me that general and fundamental concepts start to merge under an umbrella called consequences—whether it is serious consequences for an individual or consequences for humanity as a whole.



	But is that true? Is it all about the outcome rather than our starting point? 



	To be honest, although I myself claim to practice most of the time a "no difference" & "doesn't matter" approach instrumentally, and it seems to align pretty much with this temporal conclusion, as it is evident that the effort made with the general and the fundamental is rather analytical, yet the consequentialist perspective is rather pragmatic and existential, it simply feels off if we completely ditch the starting point, the initiative, the motivation, etc., to question (and act), not to mention how a question is formed—which is exactly what Beardsleys relate later in the article as philosophical examining. Going back to the title of that article, "What is Philosophy," although we all somewhat understand that it is likely a question of no definitive answer, we also know that merely defining the object of the discipline (if, by all means, it is one), aka. the philosophical questions, is obviously far from sufficient—and again, not to mention that the definition or criteria for philosophical questions itself is hardly ever sufficient nor necessarily founded. In that sense, the most we (or I) can say about the fundamental is it seems to be only necessary within that framework Beardsleys propose.



	That said, if we are to still study Beardsleys' broader framework for explaining what philosophy is and compare the importance of philosophical questions and philosophical examining as the subject and the method of such a discipline—although it is totally justifiable to say that since those are on different dimensions of consideration, the comparison makes no sense—it seems reasonable to argue for the latter once again. Of course, as Beardsleys demonstrate with the example dialogues, a seemingly trivial question can become a philosophical one in the process of constantly questioning about the question itself, about the assumptions behind a question, and about the belief that matters fundamentally. It is in that process of philosophizing that a question then becomes philosophical within the context. In other words, from this particular perspective, what is essential turns out to be the philosophizing process (the epistemology of activities rather than the ontology of questions). In a sense, a question as the starting point of philosophizing may be just as important or unimportant as the "final" question one may choose or be forced to settle with.  



	But there are hazards in only philosophizing in our minds, aka. the hazards of intellectualization and intellectualism that I constantly criticize in myself. Seeking explanations, certainties, and controls may be a part of human nature to survive the reality, yet only thinking and reasoning seem to do no good for living a life. One of the apparent reasons for this is that we eventually need to live our lives in reality rather than in the realm of ideals. In fact, as a person of incessant reflection (or de-and-reconstruction in my words), I do often find myself running on the edge of that hazard. However, even looking sideways from that reason, mere philosophizing doesn't seem to be sufficient anyway—at least the kind of philosophizing based on the logical connections among our beliefs. 



	One of the evident problems there in the framework with the fundamental, eventually, is that by considering the belief systems as something building upon logic (putting aside the fact that logic can also be "subjective" in many cases), isn't there an assumption implying that our belief systems do have a certain structure? No matter how different those structures can be. Or is it the case that our belief systems are never definitive according to some logic? Some logic itself that is certain/reliable/fathomable? In that sense, wouldn't our belief systems become objects instead of merely us? And wouldn't philosophizing become mapping some object space? Of course, we could argue back that the object space is nevertheless impactful on our choices and behaviors in reality. But again, isn't it going back to the consequentialist/instrumentalist ground? Should we try to define philosophizing from a totally different perspective? After all, other than the question of what is philosophy, there is the question of why philosophy. To my belief, the why would also answer partially the what.



	While Beardsleys do provide three somewhat sounding instrumentalist justifications—or the "benefits" in their words—they don't really satisfy our "philosophical curiosity," right? To be good at thinking, to be more assured, and to be more consistent are not bad for sure, but should philosophy only be used to secure the certainty? The certainty that may (or likely, unfortunately) not even be chosen by ourselves?  Some may say no, and some may say yes. For the time being, I'd like to redefine the fundamental by saying no—maybe something is not fundamental because it's at the end of a logic pile we can see now, but it is isomorphic to our exact becoming.



	Think, for sure. But leap, to philosophize.